Sunday, December 30, 2012

Daawo”Sawirrada”Isusoobaxyo lagu weyneynayo dhalasha nabigeena Muxamed Nnkh oo lagu qabtay degmada Caabudwaaq

Isusoobaxyadan lagu soo dhawaynayo dhalashada Nabigeena Muxamed NNKH ayaa ka dhacay Degmada Caabudwaaq ee gobolka Galguduud
Waxaa soo agaasimay Maamulka Culimaa’udiinka Ahlusuna waxaana Dadka ka qayb galay oo Isugu jiray qaybaha kala duwan ee bulshada ay gaarayeen Boqolaal dadwayne ah ayagoo Subaximadii hore ee saaka soo xaadiray garoonka kubada cakta ee Roobda’ay, waxaana la Xiray guud ahaan goobaha waxbarashada iyo ganacsiga intii uu socday Banaanbaxa.
Waxaa la arkayay gaadiidka raaxada oo socod ku maraya wadooyinka degmada iyo Dariiqoyinka Ahlusuna qaybahooda kala duwan oo qasiidooyin NABI amaan ah oo ay ku soo Dhawaynayaan xuska dhalashada Nabigeena Muxamed ka soo jeediyay goobta ay ku kulmeen Isu soo baxayaasha.
Dadka ka hadlay isu soobaxa lagu soo dhawaynayo xuska dhalashada Nabiga oo 12.ka bishan Mowliid lagu wado in la dhigo ixtifaalka Nabigeena suuban ayaa isugu jiray Culimaa’udiin, Odayaal, iyo Abwaano, kuwaasi oo ka hadlay sida ay muhiim u tahay in la wayneeyo maalintii Uu dhashay nabigeena Muxamamed waxaan ay umada soomaaliyeed ay ugu hambalyeeyeen in Ay mantaay fursad u helayaan Gobolo badan oo khawaarijta laga saaray kuwaasi oo aan horey awood ugu helin in ay dhigaan munaasabada dhalashada nabigeena Muxamad NNKH.
Guud ahaan gobolada dhexe inta ay ka arimiyaan Maamulka Culimaa’udiinka Ahlusuna waxaa Ka socda munaasabada lagu soo dhawaynayo dhalashada Nabigeena Muxamed isla markaana Waxaa si wayn usocda udayaar garowga ixtifaalka Nabigeena NNKH.

Photo by C/Kariim Axmed Bulxan from terror free somalia

Thursday, December 27, 2012

How the world's navies ignored the plight of a hijacked ship for nearly three years

How's this for a seasonal tale to warm the hearts? After almost three years in captivity, the crew of the Iceberg 1, a cargo ship hijacked by Somali pirates, are home after finally being rescued.
For the benefit of those who haven't followed the story – and there are probably plenty, as it's had only scant coverage – the Iceberg 1 was captured back in March 2010, and has languished in pirate custody ever since.
As we reported back in the summer, the ship essentially fell between two stools. Its Dubai-based owner, who appears not to have been insured, refused to pay a ransom for it and simply went to ground, ignoring pleas for help from the hostages' families.
Meanwhile, the governments representing the different sailors on board – six Indians, nine Yemenis, four Ghanaians, two Sudanese, two Pakistanis and one Filipino – were either unable or unwilling to mount a rescue attempt. So, too,was the multinational anti-piracy force, which generally prefers hijacked ships to be freed by ransom, on the basis that freeing sailors by force carries too much risk of casualties.
All of which allowed the Iceberg 1 to gain the dubious honour of becoming the longest hijack case in modern history. And one of the grimmest.
Conditions on board the boat were appalling, with the crew driven almost mad by prolonged confinement and lack of proper food and drink. Two of them died in the process, one apparently jumping overboard after becoming unhinged from stress.
As a source in the shipping world admitted to me earlier this year, the fact that the ship lay unrescued for so long is a "scar on the conscience of the industry". The families of the hostages concerned also point out – rightly I suspect – that had this case involved Westerners, it would have been resolved long ago.
Now, though, it has been – courtesy of an armed raid not by the multi-national force, but by Somalia's own fledgling anti-piracy patrols, who have been trained up a South African private military company. But while I would be the first to congratulate the Somali troops for completing what is an extremely dangerous job, I can't help wondering why it had to be left to them. Freeing hostages is normally a task deemed suitable only for highly-trained special forces, and without casting aspersions on the Somalis' abilities, I doubt they quite fall into that category.
The multinational force, on the other hand, has huge special forces assets galore, from Britain, France, the US and so on. Given the appalling plight of this ship, could they not perhaps have made an exception in this case?
The answer, I suspect, is that most nations are generally reluctant to risk the lives of their own troops to free citizens from other countries, which is probably fair enough. But this does give an idea of the limits to which the international force – and note that word "international" – is prepared to go.
One also can't help wondering why India – which now sees itself as a global superpower, and has perfectly competent special forces – couldn't have done the raid, given that six of the hostages were Indian. Yes, they would have ended up taking the lead on behalf of a few lesser nations in the process. But isn't that what being a superpower is all about?

Somali National forces with AU Forces kill more Al Shabaab, Seize weapons

Somali National forces  with AMISOM forces from the Uganda Contingent have killed several Al shabaab insurgents and seized military equipments along Marka-Afgooye road.
Nine of the insurgents were shot dead on spot when AMISOM convoy overrun an al Shabaab road ambush sending the terrorists into dismay and seizing 5 submachine guns, two high frequency military communication gadgets, 1 rocket propelled grenade with its bomb, a hand grenade, and 1 PK machine gun. There was no loss on the AMISOM side.
The Uganda Contingent Commander, Brig Michael Ondoga said: “After losing out on key urban centers, the weakened Al Shabaab is now making attempts to disrupt road security but we are gradually dealing with that too so that we can ensure free movement for the populace and facilitate access by humanitarian agencies.”

Brig Ondonga says AMISOM is committed in its support to the Somali National forces to suppress hostile activities of illegal armed groups in Somalia.
He says in the last two weeks 19 insurgents have been killed, others captured alive and several weaponry of different calibres seized, by the Ugandan Contingent. Among those killed were 7 at Buufow a few kilometres from the December 19 battle field along the same road, which the insurgents had used to stage several road ambushes which promoted AMISOM’s quick re-action.
Earlier this month, AMSIOM force commander, Lt Gen Andrew Gutti said AU forces would take necessary steps to enhance security along the road between the port city of Marka and Kilometer 50. He added that the safety of the Somali people will continue to be AMISOM’s top priority. The UN Security Council mandated AMISOM to conduct peace enforcement operations to support peace and stabilization initiatives in Somalia.
The rules of engagement among others authorize use of any means necessary in self defence and in defence of AU personnel against hostile acts or intent, and against anyone who forcefully limits free movement of AU personnel.

Alabama city struggles with international terrorism case

MOBILE, Ala. — A Mobile man pleaded not guilty on Wednesday to charges of providing support to international terrorists.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Katherine Nelson set a tentative trial date of March 3 for Randy Lamar Rasheed Wilson, 25. But everyone involved in the case, including the judge, said the trial will likely be delayed because the charges are so unusual and the evidence so vast and complicated.
“This is obviously the first one of these cases I‘ve handled and maybe the first we‘ve had here in this district,” Nelson said.
Federal agents arrested Wilson earlier this month as he was boarding a plane with his young family headed to Morocco. Prosecutors allege Wilson planned to travel from Morocco to another African country and support fellow Muslims in waging terrorist activity. The same day, agents arrested Mohammad Abdul Rahman Abukhdair, a 25-year-old Egyptian native and former business partner of Wilson‘s.
The government alleges the two men plotted with others to travel overseas and join international terrorists. The government also alleges Wilson was influenced by his friendship with fellow Mobile-area native Omar Hammami. Hammami grew up in Alabama and was raised Muslim. He later moved to Somalia and became a leading figure in the group al-Shabab. Hammami is on the FBI‘s list of most wanted terrorists.
Wilson‘s attorney, Domingo Soto, said Wednesday that Wilson has been unfairly targeted because of his past acquaintance with Hammami and that Wilson only wanted to travel to Morocco to study his religion with his family in an Islamic country.
Soto said he will fight the government‘s charges and efforts to keep much of the evidence against Wilson under a seal through a protective order claiming it is a national security issue.
“We are going to fight this all the way,” he said. “We are going to fight the detention, the indictment and the protective order.”
Soto said much of the evidence against Wilson came from statements he made to an FBI informant and to an undercover agent. Wilson‘s statements were theoretical and there is no proof that he planned any violent actions,


Monday, December 24, 2012

Three Supporters of Foreign Terrorist Organization al Shabaab Charged in Brooklyn Federal Court, Face Life in Prison

U.S. Attorney’s Office December 21, 2012
  • Eastern District of New York (718) 254-7000

Earlier today, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, a superseding indictment was unsealed charging three men with providing material support to the designated foreign terrorist organization al Shabaab and the unlawful use of high-powered firearms. The defendants, Ali Yasin Ahmend, also known as “Ismail”; Madhi Hashi, also known as “Talha”; and Mohamed Yusuf, also known as “Abu Zaid,” “Hudeyfa,” and “Mohammed Abdulkadir,” appeared in federal court in Brooklyn before the Honorable Sandra L. Townes this morning.
As stated in court today and according to court documents, between approximately December 2008 and August 2012, the defendants participated in weapons and explosives training with members and associates of al Shabaab, and they agreed with others to support al Shabaab and its Islamic extremist agenda. They were also deployed in combat operations to support al Shabaab’s military action in Somalia. In addition, the defendants participated in an elite al Shabaab suicide bomber program.
The charges were announced by Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; George Venizelos, Assistant Director in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office (FBI); and Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, New York City Police Department (NYPD).
“As alleged in the indictment, the defendants were committed supporters of al Shabaab, a violent terrorist organization, who used high-powered firearms and participated in combat operations and al Shabaab’s suicide bombing program. We will use every tool at our disposal to combat terrorist groups, deter terrorist activity, and incapacitate individual terrorists,” stated United States Attorney Lynch. Ms. Lynch thanked the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies who participate in the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York, as well as the Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs and Counterterrorism Section, for their work on the case.
“As alleged, these defendants are not aspiring terrorists, they are terrorists. They did more than receive terrorist training: they put that training to practice in terrorist operations with al Shabaab. Their capture and prosecution are important steps in the continuing campaign against terrorism,” stated Assistant Director in Charge Venizelos.
In early August 2012, the defendants were apprehended in Africa by local authorities while on their way to Yemen. On October 18, 2012, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York returned a sealed indictment against the defendants. On November 14, 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation took custody of the defendants and brought them to the Eastern District of New York.
On November 15, 2012, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the defendants with one count of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Shabaab, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B; one count of providing material support to al Shabaab, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B; and one count of unlawful use of machine guns, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c). Later that same day, the defendants were assigned counsel and arraigned before Magistrate Judge Joan M. Azrack. At the joint request of the government and the defendants, those arraignments occurred in a sealed courtroom.
If convicted of all charges, each defendant faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years and a maximum sentence of life in prison.
The government’s case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Shreve Ariail, Seth D. DuCharme, and Richard M. Tucker, with assistance from Trial Attorneys Joshua Larocca and Kelli Andrews of the Counterterrorism Section and Trial Attorneys Dan Stigall and Shanna Batten Aguirre of the Office of International Affairs.
The charges contained in the indictment are merely allegations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
Ali Yasin Ahmed, also known as “Ismail”
Age: 27
Madhi Hashi, also known as “Talha”
Age: 23
Mohamed Yusuf, also known as “Abu Zaid,” “Hudeyfa,” and “Mohammed Abdulkadir”
Age: 29

Hope blooms for family in 'peaceful' Somalia - Africa - Al Jazeera English

Hope blooms for family in 'peaceful' Somalia - Africa - Al Jazeera English

Saturday, December 22, 2012

3 Men Accused of Training With Somalia's Al Shabaab Appear in New York Court

Three men appeared in Federal District Court in Brooklyn on Friday on charges that they had trained to be suicide bombers with a Somali terrorist group.
The defendants, Ali Yasin Ahmed, 27, Mahdi Hashi, 23, and Mohamed Yusuf, 29, were arrested in August by authorities in Africa while going to Yemen. They are accused of participating in weapons and explosives training with Al Shabab, a United States-designated terrorist group linked to Al Qaeda, during a four-year period beginning in 2008. Court documents show no connection between the alleged crimes and the United States.
Much of the case is shrouded in mystery. For four months, the case remained under seal, and the court documents unsealed on Friday contained little elaboration on the crimes or any indication of why the case was brought in New York. Even the nationalities of the men were unclear. They appeared in court with the aid of a Swedish interpreter.
The case is not the first brought in New York involving foreigners accused of acts of terrorism abroad. In June, an Eritrean man, Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, pleaded guilty in Federal District Court in Manhattan to conspiring to support Al Shabab. More than 30 defendants have been prosecuted in this country for supporting the group.
Al Shabab is known for a strict Islamist ideology calling for amputations and public stonings for violations of Islamic law.
American prosecutors have said the group worked closely with Al Qaeda in Yemen and Pakistan, harboring terrorists wanted for bombings of United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Mahdi Hashi was stripped of his British citizenship in June

In a statement, Loretta E. Lynch, the United States attorney for the Eastern District of New York, said, “We will use every tool at our disposal to combat terrorist groups, deter terrorist activity and incapacitate individual terrorists.” ...via nyt 

Hope blooms for family in 'peaceful' Somalia - Africa - Al Jazeera English

Al Jazeera has launched a series of reports called "One Year, Four Families" that looks back at some of this year's major stories as seen through the eyes of the people who experienced them.
Somalia has been wracked by decades of internal conflict, but new hope blossomed with the election of a new president earlier this year.In the last part of the series, Peter Greste spoke to one Somali family struggling for survival in Mogadishu.
Hope blooms for family in 'peaceful' Somalia - Africa - Al Jazeera English

Friday, December 21, 2012

Exporting insurgency

Somalia | Somalia's largest terrorist group may be losing its grip within the country but is moving across borders with violence and persecution
Mursal Isse Siad became one of the latest victims of Islamist violence in Somalia when two masked men shot and killed the 55-year-old on Dec. 8. The assailants fled after gunning him down in Beledweyne, his hometown 200 miles north of Mogadishu, the capital.
Siad received death threats on his cell phone for leaving Islam, local sources told Morning Star News: “He failed to attend the mosque for prayers and used to pray at home. He used to share with us about Jesus,” explained his 15-year-old daughter. A Muslim resident in Beledweyne said he “deserved to die” because he was no longer committed to Islam.
A UN-backed government in Somalia—supported by an 18,000-strong African Union force—has made important gains in recent months against al Shabaab, the terrorist movement fighting for control in Somalia. Al Shabaab has lost key cities, including the port city of Kismayo, which fell to AU forces in October, but it still controls large parts of central Somalia. There the militants have banned radio stations from playing music and outlawed bell ringing to signal the end of classes “because they sound like church bells.”
Siad and his wife, who converted to Christianity in 2000, moved to Beledweyne in central Somalia after the government and AU forces captured the town from al Shabaab last year. Siad had taken a job with a local nongovernmental organization but was known to have left Islam. His death is a reminder that targeted violence against Christians in Somalia hasn’t diminished, and al Shabaab, even on the losing end of war, has promised to rid the country of Christians, who are mostly converts from Islam.
Of mounting concern to Somalia’s neighbors is that as the Islamic insurgency movement gets squeezed in Somalia, it is finding new life in nearby countries, particularly Kenya.
From Somalia across Africa, alarm is spreading about the rise of Islamic extremists, some with ties to Pakistan-based al-Qaeda. U.S. Defense Department officials plan to seek new authorization from Congress in the new year to go after such groups after one al-Qaeda offshoot took over territory in Mali last year and is fighting its government. The U.S. administration has called the Mali situation a “powder keg,” according to The Wall Street Journal.
“The conditions today are vastly different than they were previously,” Gen. Carter Ham, the head of U.S. Africa command, told the Journal. “There are now non-al Qaeda-associated groups that present significant threats to the United States.” He said a debate over new authorization is a “worthy discussion.”
In East Africa, cross-border attacks from Somalia against Kenyan churches are on the rise, with all the markings of al Shabaab violence. Somalis have taken refuge from their country’s violence not only in sprawling camps near the border but for years in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city. Not all are destitute: New luxury condominiums and other real estate boons are the result of bounty offloaded by Somali pirates, locals say.
But Kenya is also experiencing a dramatic rise in terrorist violence, particularly in Eastleigh, a clogged suburb east of Nairobi’s central business district also known as “Little Mogadishu.” Kenya’s Christians make up 85 percent of the country’s population, but entering Eastleigh is like arriving at an Islamic, even Arab, enclave. Women dress in full-length black head coverings, and calls to prayer blare from megaphones mounted over shopping malls.
With the changes have come rising violence directed at Kenyans, and particularly Christians in Eastleigh. Last November a grenade attack killed seven residents, and authorities say they traced it to al Shabaab. In December militants killed 14 people in three separate attacks in Eastleigh, the worst killing at least 10 people when a bomb exploded on a minibus full of passengers. And on Dec. 16 another grenade explosion injured one resident.
I met with one of Eastleigh’s Christian leaders in an upstairs apartment stocked with bookshelves full of NIV Bibles and Bible commentaries. He is not named for security reasons—as he is a former Muslim who studied and trained for a time, he said, with jihadists associated with militant jihadist groups. In 2006 after becoming a Christian he moved to Eastleigh with his wife: “We used to do outreach in Eastleigh but now there is only one church remaining.”
Of 200 churches in the area, all but one, called Deliverance Church, have been destroyed or forced to shut down. In a case that made headlines and eventually went to court, a group of Somali backers managed to secure the deed to property for one of the largest churches, a 13-acre site on a prominent corner where Eastleigh’s Gospel Furthering Bible Church had met since 1968. Missionaries held services on the property going back to the 1930s. The Somalis eventually forced out the congregation and bulldozed the church, leaving a mostly vacant parcel surrounded by 20-foot-high corrugated metal barriers.

Presidents of Kenya and Somalia Joint Communique

At the invitation of H.E. President Mwai Kibaki, H.E. Hassan Sheikh MohamudPresident of the Federal Republic of Somalia paid a one day visit to Kenya on Friday, 21stDecember, 2012.
The two Heads of State held wide ranging consultations on various issues of bilateral and regional interest and at the end of the meeting concluded as follows:

Welcomed the recent political developments in Somalia which culminated in the installation of a new Parliament and Government and congratulated the people of Somalia for this historic milestone.
Acknowledged that Kenya and Somalia shared a common destiny and hence the importance of enhancing and deepening bilateral ties between the two countries for the mutual benefit of the two peoples.
Emphasized the need for regular bilateral consultations on various issues of mutual concern and interest.
Stressed the need to revitalize the Joint Commission for Co-operation (JCC) signed between the two countries in September, 2005 as the key framework upon which bilateral engagements between the two countries will be based on.In this regard, they mandated their respective Foreign Ministers to commence immediately the preparatory work which will culminate in the re-launch of the JCC.
Underscored the need to co-ordinate and co-operate both at the bilateral, regional and international levels efforts geared towards consolidation of peace and security in Somalia as well as reconstruction of the country and building of new institutions of governance.
Noted with concern the situation of Somali refugees who live in crowded conditions in camps in North Eastern Kenya and pledged to work together and with the international community to come up with modalities for their orderly return to Somalia to rebuild their lives and participate in the development of their motherland.
Commended the role of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia and other liberated areas and stressed the need to support this process which has been endorsed by the IGAD Heads of State and Government, the African Union and the UN Security Council.
Noted with appreciation the role of AMISOM in liberating large parts of Somalia from Al Shabaab militants and called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to consider favourably the extension of the mandate of AMISOM when it expires on 7thMarch, 2013, so that AMISOM can continue helping in the process of consolidation of peace and security in Somalia.
Recalled the negative impact on the sub-region of the breakdown of law and order in Somalia over the years and acknowledged as legitimate the consensus and interest of the sub-region in ensuring peace, security and stability in Somalia.
Done in Nairobi on this 21st day of December, 2012
H.E. Mwai Kibaki H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
President of the Republic of Kenya. President of the Federal Republic of Somalia

Ethiopia and Kenya Have Taken Over Somalia

The recent Memorandum of Understanding delegitimizes the federal government and pre-empts its sovereign leadership role in the internal and external affairs of Somalia
  Dr-Mohamud M Uluso, a Somalia analyst

In implementing their recently concluded regional security cooperation agreement and reaffirming their indefinite military occupation of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya have decided to takeover and perhaps later annex Somalia under the cover of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Since only Ethiopia exercises uncontested power within the Organization, on 6 December 2012, IGAD Joint Committee of Ethiopia and Kenya under the auspices of former Kenyan Minister, Mr. Kipruto Arap Kirwa, IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation (IFSPR), issued a statement and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Grand Stabilization plan (GSP) for South and Central Somalia.


As explained in the prerelease statement, the GSP covers political reconciliation, local administration, national security, rule of law, and delivery of necessary assistance to communities in need. In addition to Ethiopia and Kenya, a Somali team liaised with the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somalia and led by former head of the Somali National Security Services (SNSS), General Mohamed Sheikh Hassan attended the IGAD Joint Committee deliberations in Addis Ababa. It is not clear if the new federal government had full knowledge of the team's existence, working responsibilities and accountability.
The Office of IFSPR is independent from IGAD's Secretariat. The IGAD Facilitator is based in Addis Ababa, while the IGAD Secretariat is based in Djibouti. For further background information, on 28 April 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding on Somalia has been signed among AMISOM, UNPOS, and IGAD Facilitator. This tripartite MoU marginalizes IGAD Executive Secretary, Inj. Mahboub Maalim who is of a Somali-Kenyan origin from Somalia peace process.
The new IGAD Joint Committee initiative takes place while the international community- the donor countries, the United Nations, the Arab league, the Organization of Islamic Countries and the African Union are reviewing their strategic cooperation with the newly elected post transitional federal government in the light of the decisions reached during the Mini Summit held in New York in September 2012. Furthermore, it comes out after the first official visit of the president of the federal government, Dr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to Ethiopia and Djibouti and in the midst of his official visit to Turkey with which the federal government has signed important economic and security agreements.


Fortunately with unblinking honesty, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG), Peter de Clercq published a brief titled 'What next for the United Nations in Somalia?' in the Tumblr blog of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in which he highlighted the ongoing strategic review process dictated by the new political dispensation. While reading the brief is more informative, the DSRGS made the following critical points:
• That the federal Government has sought UN and AU support for rebuilding the security apparatus (national army and police force), rebuilding a credible judiciary system, implementing a decentralization and local/regional administrations as well as undertaking a comprehensive capacity building of Somali Institutions;
• That the UN has committed to align itself along the 'six pillars' plan announced by the President of Somalia and the new UN mission will concentrate on state and peace building. He quoted President Hassan Mohamud saying to the UN Review Mission: 'If you don't start treating us as a viable State, we will never become one.'
• Finally that the ambitions of the new administration match the challenges ahead and that the administration has asked a space to think through and implement the new strategy laid out by the president in his 'six pillars' strategy.
It is absolutely buoyant to see that an official of UNPOS is capable to voice such a rightful and honest statement in opportune time so that the end of transition would not be a farce. The DSRSG argued forcefully that 'peace building is a complex business, but not giving this important [Somali] initiative a chance brings even bigger risks.' Time will tell if his views are embraced wholeheartedly and implemented without delay by his leaders.
Rather than reinforcing the message of his deputy and five days before the signing of the MoU in Nairobi, Kenya planned for 13 December 2012, the SRGS, Dr. Augustine Mahiga, issued a statement in which he welcomed the IGAD Facilitator Initiative for Somalia. The assertion that the new initiative is a Somali-owned, led process is far from the truth.
The content of MoU raises many questions and concerns. It consists of a preamble and 9 articles. The preamble stresses the threat of terrorism, threats of State, human insecurities, other emerging security concerns, commitment of government of Somalia to work within IGAD's framework and stabilization, and the 'required partnership engagement' for greater stability in Somalia. Article 5 of the MoU overrides and restricts the constitutional, political and administrative responsibilities, prerogative and citizens' relationship of the Somali Government.


First and foremost, the MoU delegitimizes the federal government and pre-empts its sovereign leadership role in the internal and external affairs of Somalia. It attempts to completely abort the prospect of the international efforts geared towards statebuilding and peacebuilding in Somalia. It is takeover, not support of Somalia. Above all, it ignores the political arrangement created by the adoption of the provisional constitution, the ending of the transitional period and the rehabilitation of Somali State in accordance with the political platform announced by the new Government.
Other glaring shortcomings of the MoU include the exclusion of Eritrea, Sudan, Uganda, Djibouti and Burundi, and the empowerment of IGAD Facilitator over UN/AU Facilitators. The MoU creates multiple overlaps and weakens the centrally guided and coordinated implementation of the approved Somali National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), which outlines in detail the establishment of complex structures at national, regional and district levels and the legislations required to create a secure and safer Somalia. These tasks fall under the jurisdiction of the President, Federal Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
During his first visit to Kenya in November 2012, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia stated that his country views Kenya as a strategic all-weather partner and friend in a troubled region. He also defended Kenya's direct control of the process for setting up administrations in Jubba and Gedo regions in violation of Somali sovereignty, provisional constitution and UN resolutions.
It is interesting to see if the international community and the United Nations are willing to go along with the Ethiopian and Kenyan takeover of Somalia in violation of the latter's independent self-governance and political transformation. The Ethiopian bid to secure its regional power role at a time of state failure, civil conflicts and undemocratic regimes in power could be potentially a destabilizing factor rather than a stabilizing power in the region.
As a matter of urgency, the federal government has to streamline its strategic dealing with the international community, develop and practice protocols and procedures for uprooting its internal dysfunctional behavior and creating disciplined working habit that will strengthen its decision making and execution process. The basis of this reform must be the development of a national political platform that will boost national loyalty to a clear domestic and foreign policy agenda. In a nutshell, to diminish the unwarranted external influences and interferences, the federal government must act quickly by mobilizing the public awareness on citizenship, sense of patriotism, justice, social harmony and common interests.


Wednesday, December 19, 2012

American Disowned by al-Shabaab Implies Group Responsible for Foreign Fighter Deaths

Al-Shabaab’s most prominent American fighter Abu Mansur al-Amriki, aka Omar Hammami, has been in a tenuous state in the group since releasing a March 2012 video stating his life was in danger due to differences with leaders.
He also has issued several public criticisms of the group. Most recently, Hammami’s twitter account released a biting response to al-Shabaab’s public rebuke of the embattled American.
In a string of tweets, Hammami blamed al-Shabaab’s leadership for the exodus of foreign fighters and even implicated it in the death of several prominent foreigners working with the group in the recent past:

Arming Teachers

Think it's a good idea to arm teachers? There's a place where they've tried that already..somalia
Arming teachers is just one of many ideas being discussed in the wake of last week's tragic shooting in Connecticut.

U.S. jihadist kicked out of Somali jihadist group

Omar Hammami, so-called American Shabaab, may meet his demise soon. Not at hands of a US missile, but Shabab

You can't stay where they don't want you. In an odd turn of events, a self-proclaimed American jihadist has been soundly booted out of the militant Somali group al Shabaab - as if anyone would want to be connected to that group in the first place - for his unprofessional conduct. Omar Hammami, the employee in question, who is also known as Abu Mansour al Amriki - or "the American," most have had mighty low standards

 Mogadishu Somalia(terrorfreesomalia) - Al Shabaab in a written statement declared that, "Abu Mansour al-Amriki does not, in any way, shape or form, represent the views" of the group. Entitled "A Candid Clarification" - was posted on the media-savvy al Shabaab's Twitter feed in both Arabic and English.

It must be noted that all types of misfits in Western societies have been attracted to the jihadist cause. In either case, Al Shabaab has steadily lost ground to an African Union interventionist force in Somalia.

Months after the capital of Mogadishu fell from al Shabaab control in September, the jihadist group withdrew from their last major urban stronghold, the southern port of Kismayu. The move signaled their demise as a quasi-conventional military force.

Tension between al Amriki and al Shabaab have been playing out publicly on jihadist media circles since both parties are tirelessly self-promoting, jihadist content-creating machines.

Signs of a very visible strain came in March, when al Amriki released a video statement disclosing that his life was under threat from fellow al Shabaab fighters due to "differences that occurred between U.S. regarding matters of the sharia and matters of strategy."

Pundits noted how al Amriki, an Alabama native, born to a Muslim father and Christian mother, was to live with, much less fight with.

In a noted from the "press office" of the "Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen" (that's the official al Shabaab name) accused al Amriki of "childish petulance" and that "the alleged frictions and the video releases are merely the results of personal grievances that stem purely from a narcissistic pursuit of fame and are far removed from the reality on the ground."

The discontented little Jihadist released a second video clip in October decrying his marginalization. According to the latest al Shabaab statement, the timing of these releases were calculated to "cultivate the seeds of disunity" at a time when the group was "most likely to be under pressure from their enemies."

"Now that is indeed a candid acknowledgment of the group's sinking fortunes," columnist Leela Jacinto with France 24 opines.

"There was a time when Somalia was a hotspot on the jihadi tourism trail, with U.S. intelligence officials estimating that dozens of Americans - including Americans of Somali origins - joining al Shabaab ranks," Jacinto writes.

Amriki, she says " burnt [his] bridges - on both ends, I might add. Now we'll see how - and if - you get out of this latest twist. Because if there's one thing I'm sure of, whatever al Amriki does, we'll hear about it."

Americans Urged to Petition White House on Terrorist Group

Petition Calls for formal designation of Boko Haram, Ends on December 29
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19, 2012 /Christian Newswire/ -- Jubilee Campaign has petitioned the White House to designate the Nigerian Jihadist group Boko Haram as a "foreign terrorist organization." Boko Haram is responsible for killing an estimated 3,000 Nigerians and citizens of 9 other countries -- primarily Christians -- in the last three years and has acknowledged it has ties to Somalian terrorist groups and Al Qaeda. The prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague recently found probable cause that the group committed crimes against humanity. The Petition is available on the White House website for any concerned citizen to sign.
"Boko Haram has demonstrated a vigorous commitment to terrorist tactics, killing thousands of innocents in pursuit of their global jihadist ambitions," said Jubilee Campaign's Executive Director Ann Buwalda. "It is high time for the State Department to demonstrate an equal commitment to truth, justice and the rule of law, by acknowledging and confronting Boko Haram as the terrorists they are."
Earlier this year, Boko Haram called for the religious cleansing and genocide of Christians in northern Nigeria. Since then, the group's indiscriminate bombings have killed Christians, moderate Muslims, and others it considers "infidels." The victims have included men, women, and children as well as soldiers, police, and journalists.
Boko Haram has also threatened U.S. interests and attacked U.S. citizens. At least, two Americans, one a United Nations official and the other a U.S. official, survived a bombing in August 2011 at the U.N. headquarters in Nigeria. The U.S. embassy has continually warned of threats to Western targets and advised U.S. diplomats to be wary of attending religious services. Attacks that took place this year on Jan. 20 in Kano claimed more than 200 lives, making it the highest single-day death toll in any global conflict in 2012.
Despite this the State Department has refused to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist group, claiming that they are mostly concerned with local political ambitions. Leaving aside the fact that Boko Haram's local political ambitions are overthrowing the Nigerian government, ending democracy, and instituting what they call "full sharia law," the sheer number of attacks Boko Haram has carried out on churches and other civilian targets, clearly show them to be a terrorist group with religious motivations.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 empowers the State Department to designate such groups as "foreign terrorist organizations." Such a designation would have numerous effects, including the ability to freeze and seize bank accounts, arrest and deport Boko Haram members and associates, and impose sanctions on countries that fund the terrorist group.
"The lack of an FTO for Boko Haram is quite telling, particularly given the recent designation of the Syrian group Jabhat al-Nusra, which has a sparse record of military focused suicide bombing compared to Boko's track record of suicide-bombing primarily defenseless civilian populations" said Emmanuel Ogebe, a legal expert on Nigeria who worked on the petition. "That the State Department could label Al-Nusra after 1 year when Boko Haram is in its 9th year clearly shows that arbitrary political considerations trump evidence or body counts. It is unfortunate that the State Department is playing favorites with terrorists instead of responding to facts."
The Petition currently has just over a thousand signatures. We need 24,000 people of good faith to sign and demand truth from their government and justice for the Nigerian people.
Jubilee Campaign promotes the human rights and religious liberty of ethnic and religious minorities; advocates the release of prisoners of conscience imprisoned on account of their faith; advocates for and assists refugees fleeing religious based persecution; and protects and promotes the dignity and safety of children from bodily harm and sexual exploitation. Jubilee Campaign holds special consultative status with ECOSOC at the United Nations.

Wives of imprisoned al-Shabaab suspects face shattered futures

 two Somali women in Puntland  front of the Somali National Security Agency (NSA)
Every day nearly 60 women gather in front of the Somali National Security Agency (NSA) detention centre in Mogadishu to see what has become of their loved ones who are accused of terrorism, subversion or affiliation with al-Shabaab.
For most of these women, they can only lament, as the crimes their husbands and sons committed on behalf of al-Shabaab have ruined their families' lives.
"I bear witness that al-Shabaab brainwashes youths and other valuable members of society they use [to carry out] their hostilities and explosions," said Leilo Adan Agane, 25, wife of Yonis Said, who has been in prison since October 11th and is still awaiting trial.
She said her husband was arrested in Mogadishu's Hodan district in an early morning operation. "He had three hand grenades and a pistol in his possession. He was accused of planning a terrorist attack," she told Sabahi.
"Therefore, I admit that al-Shabaab destroyed my family when they armed my husband by exploiting his lack of employment," Agane said. "I am stating emphatically that I regret this, and I am asking Somali parents to protect their children from being recruited by al-Shabaab, which destroys the hopes of Somali families."
For 29-year-old Hibaq Abdirahman, an eight-month pregnant mother of three, her husband's crimes have left her desperate.
"I ask that [my husband] be released because he financially supported our family and I cannot support my children and mother, and my brother is mentally ill and I cannot [afford] to send him to a hospital," she told Sabahi.
Abdirahman said her husband worked at a small shop in Bakara market in Mogadishu. Security forces detained him along with dozens of other militants late at night in the Hodan district, she said.
"I do not know what has become of him, but I miss him," she said.
Faiza Ibrahim, 27, said her husband was arrested on November 7th after he threw a bomb at a Somali police patrol in the Heliwa district in north-eastern Mogadishu, a former al-Shabaab stronghold.
She visits the prison every day to bring her husband food, but she has not been able to see or speak to him. All Ibrahim can do is let her imagination run.
"I have heard from former prisoners that hundreds of inmates are chained in a big underground cell without any windows, lighting, bedding or blankets to sleep on," she told Sabahi. "They are given food through an opening in an iron door […] and can only see sunlight at 10 o'clock in the morning."
Shukri Yusuf Omar, a 49-year-old resident of the Yaqshid neighbourhood of Mogadishu, said her son and his wife have been detained by the intelligence services for the past four weeks. They face charges of sheltering terrorists in their home as well as concealing weapons and explosives in a hole hidden in one of their bedrooms, she said.
Omar said she has requested that the authorities release her son and daughter-in-law or put them on trial without delay.
"I can guarantee that neither of them will go back to what they were doing because prison is not a walk in the park," she told Sabahi.

The NSA detention centre

The NSA detention centre, previously known as the Investigation Centre of the October 21st Socialist Party, is situated on a hill next to the presidential palace in central Mogadishu.
The building comprises two floors, one of which is for female inmates and offices for investigation officers, while the other is a large hall for male inmates, said Isse Ali, who works in the NSA's data and image analysis department.
Ali said investigators do not use torture tactics against prisoners, but they do isolate them from family and friends while the undergo interrogations.
"At the beginning of detention, detainees are banned from seeing their families for a certain period of time and are cut off from the outside world," Ali told Sabahi.
Investigators collect additional information by using undercover officers who pretend to be prisoners, he said.
After the investigation is completed, prisoners are sent to the central prison close to Benadir Court to await trial, he said.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Shabaab rebukes American commander Omar Hammami

Shabaab, al Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, has broken its nearly 12-month silence on Omar Hammami, the American commander who served with the terrorist group and has claimed his life was in danger due to divisions between Somali jihadists and foreign fighters. The terror group now states that Hammami was not a senior member of the group and that he has manufactured a false controversy for personal gain over the issue of divisions between local Somali jihadists.
The Somali terror group released the statement yesterday on Hammami, who is also known as Abu Mansour al Amriki. Earlier this year Hammami issued two videos: one in March in which he claimed his life was in danger, and another in October in which he said he was threatened due to divisions between local and foreign jihadists [see LWJ reports, American terrorist feels 'life may be endangered' by Shabaab, and Omar Hammami says 'friction' exists between Shabaab, foreign fighters]. Both videos were shot at the same time. Shabaab issued a statement in March denying that Hammami was in danger.
Yesterday's official statement from Shabaab, titled "Abu Mansour al Amriki: A Candid Clarification," was posted on Shabaab's official Twitter account. Shabaab claims that the videos released by Hammami (who is referred to as Abu Mansour in the statement) were portrayed in the media as evidence that "deep ideological differences were begin to devour the Mujahideen." The terror group rejects the depiction, and accuses Hammami of being a narcissist.
Shabaab "hereby declares that Abu Mansour al Amriki does not, in any way, shape or form, represent the views of the Muhajireen [emigrants or foreign fighters] in Somalia," the statement says. "The opinions expressed by Abu Mansour, the alleged frictions and the video releases are merely the results of personal grievances that stem purely from a narcissistic pursuit of fame and are far removed from the reality on the ground."
Shabaab then denies that Hammami holds a senior or even a middle-level leadership position within the ranks of the terror group.
"[C]ontrary to portrait of the grand strategist, recruiter and fund-raiser portrayed by the Western media, Abu Mansur Al-Amriki does not hold any position of authority within [Shabaab]," the statement says.
Shabaab says it remained silent on the issue of Hammami as "the Mujahideen have been offering advice to Abu Mansour in private, without publicly rebuking him, employing every possible avenue to veil his faults, overlook his shortcomings and conceal the egregious errors he'd committed ...."
The group explains that it decided to denounce Hammami only after he refused its advice: "[I]t becomes religiously and morally incumbent upon the Mujahideen to publicly advise the Muslim Ummah [community] of his obstinacy and insistence on sowing disunity among the vanguards of this Ummah."
Shabaab then accuses Hammami of attempting to sow discord in the rank and file just as the African Union and Somali forces were ousting the terror group from their strongholds south of Mogadishu in March, and then from Kismayo in October.
"Hence, the timing of the releases and the convergence of the entire East African nations upon the Mujahideen were not entirely coincidental occurrences but a calculated attempt to draw attention to the alleged voices of dissent within the ranks of the Mujahideen at a time when theywere most likely to be under pressure from their enemies so as to cultivate the destructive seeds of disunity," Shabaab states.
Shabaab then apologizes "to the Muslim Ummah in general and our Mujahideen brothers in all the fields of Jihad in particular for having to witness such childish petulance in one of the theatres of Jihad, from its tracks or the spirit of this great Ummah dampened by the superficial allegations, frivolous ramblings and whimsical desires of those who wish to enhance their image at the price of Jihad and the Mujahideen, spreading discord and disunity in the process."
The Somali terror group does not indicate what is to be done with Hammami after essentially accusing him of treasonous acts. Nor does Shabaab state whether Hammami is in its custody.
Background on Omar Hammami

Hammami has served as a military commander, propagandist, "recruitment strategist, and financial manager" for Shabaab, and is closely linked to al Qaeda, according to the US government. Hammami is on the US's list of specially designated global terrorists.
In May 2011, Hammami spoke at a public rally with other top Shabaab leaders to eulogize Osama bin Laden just 10 days after the death of the al Qaeda leader. During the rally, Hammani appeared with other top al Qaeda-linked Shabaab leaders, including Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansour and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.
"We are all Osama," Hammami told the crowd as he spoke at a podium. He also said that Shabaab and al Qaeda would continue their jihad to establish a global Islamic caliphate.
"Today, we remind the Muslims that the caliphate [Islamic rule] shall soon be reborn," Hammani said while eulogizing bin Laden. "May Allah accept our dear beloved sheikh [Osama bin Laden] and cause our swords to become instruments of his avenging."
Prior to this year, Hammami had played a crucial role in Shabaab's propaganda efforts to recruit Western fighters to join Shabaab's jihad in Somalia. In December 2011 and January 2012, Hammami appeared in photographs with a Western fighter. The Long War Journal identified the fighter as Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, an American who recruited for the terror group and left the US in October 2009 to wage jihad in Somalia. Faarax is wanted by the FBI.
Hammami was reported to have been killed in a US airstrike in March 2011, but one month later he released a nasheed, or song, that mocked the reports [see LWJ report, American Shabaab commander Omar Hammami releases tape that mocks reports of his death]. In the clumsy rap, Hammami said he wanted to die in a US airstrike or special operations raid, like other top al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Laith al Libi, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, and Abu Musab al Zarqawi.
This year, Hammami issued an unauthorized autobiography, and then later released a photograph of himself holding up a copy of the work. The photograph ended the rumors that he had been executed by Shabaab for releasing the video in March in which he claimed his life was in danger.

Monday, December 17, 2012

Attacks in Kenya Point to al-Shabaab and Its Sympathizers

On 5 December 2012, attackers detonated an IED along a busy road in Eastleigh, killing 1 and injuring 9.
Two days later, a grenade attack on the al-Hidaya mosque killed 5 people and injured 37, including Eastleigh MP Abdi Yusuf Hassan (above).
Members of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC)–a radical group that advocates for Jihad in response to marginalization against Kenyan Muslims–has claimed that the “mujahideen” were responsible for recent attacks in Nairobi’s neighborhood of Eastleigh.
After three grenade attacks since 5 December 2012, Nairobi’s Eastleigh community is reeling from continued insecurity.
In a recent tweet, the group boasted about two recent grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks:
While this was not a direct admittance of responsibility, there are increasing reasons to believe either al-Shabaab or its sympathizers (including MYC) are directly or indirectly responsible for the attacks.
  • According to UN reports from 2011 and 2012 (and MYC’s own statements), MYC has direct connections to al-Shabaab in Somalia and other violent extremist organizations–including the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre in Tanga, Tanzania.
  • MYC members have been trained by al-Shabaab and have sent members between Somalia and Kenya for operations on both sides of the border.
  • Al-Shabaab tapped former MYC leader Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali as its Coordinator for Kenyan operations in February 2012. (The whereabouts of Sheikh Iman Ali are unknown.)
  • In recent statements, MYC has called for all sympathetic and allied groups to engage more vigorously in Jihad in East Africa, and al-Shabaab–of no surprise–has done the same.
  • Al-Shabaab’s top leader Ahmed Godane has stated that the group is capable of carrying out attacks in Kenya and has welcomed the cause of the Mombasa Republican Council–a separatist group on the country’s coast aiming to redress longstanding marginalization by the Kenyan government.
Overall, al-Shabaab and its sympathizers have made open threats on Kenya, organized the necessary operational structures, and trained its members for operations against the country–presumably done with intentions to follow through on its threats.It is more likely that these extremist groups are responsible for the recent attacks in Eastleigh as opposed to criminal gangs like Superpowers and Sky, which are more interested in theft than launching grenades.There are also few groups with access to resources such as hand grenades or have the capability to set up and deploy remote-controlled IEDs.

Government Response

The Kenyan government’s response to the violence has raised concerns among Eastleigh residents.

Mass arrests of 600 “suspects” in connection to one of the recent attacks has reinforced the perception that Kenyan security forces rely on thug tactics–especially against ethnic Somalis–during the course of its investigations.As a result, there are less incentives for Eastleigh residents to comply with police investigations if they believe they will be arrested as an accomplice or if innocent community members are being falsely accused.Equally worrying, Kenyan government officials have proposed on several occasions that the 523,000 estimated Somali refugees (who they blame for the attacks) should return to Somalia or return to refugee camps in order to expel the “perpetrators” of the violence. However, this would involve countless legal and logistical hurdles for which little to no known planning has been made. And more importantly, it unfairly punishes a large number of Somali refugees who have overcome adversity to become financially independent in lives outside the Kenyan camps.

“I have a small tailoring business which enables me to live comfortably, but if they take me back to a camp my life will be destroyed.” –Halima Yusuf Ahmed, Somali refugee

With major elections in March 2013, the Kenyan government has much to do regarding security sector reform, addressing the grievances of marginalized communities, and improving the relationships between increasingly hostile social groups in the country.

If these issues are not taken up, it will be difficult to sufficiently address ongoing security problems and the need to prevent a repeat of the electoral violence that occurred in late 2007 in which at least 1,000 people were killed and 180,000 displaced.

The Last Stand of Somalia's Jihad

KISMAYO, Somalia — Incredibly, this small port city, a study in ruin in a country that is a parable of ruin, boasts two airports. There is the new airport, as it's known, laughably to all who touch down there, which lies 10 miles inland and consists of a couple of mostly tarmacked runways and the carcass of a terminal. Kismayo International Airport, in blue block letters, is just barely visible above the building's sun-bleached cornice. Stencil-painted on the wall below that, and more legible, is the flag of the Islamist insurgent movement that until recently controlled Kismayo, Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, or al-Shabab -- a black rectangle over white classical Somali script that reads "There Is No God But God."

A half-hour drive away, hidden among the sand dunes just outside Kismayo, is the long-dormant "old" airport. It offers one dirt runway and, in the place of a terminal, a half-century-old army personnel carrier, rusted to the color of primeval toast, left over from the days when Kismayo was part of Italian Somaliland. What it lacks in infrastructure the old airport makes up for in exclusive coastal access. The beach nearby was once popular with European sunbathers, but after two decades of civil war, it's so deserted one could walk along the Indian Ocean for days without encountering another person.

Both airports now belong to the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), which swept into Kismayo in early October with three mechanized battalions, backed up by soldiers from the Somali National Army and a local militia called Ras Kamboni; they are the poles in the southern axis of Sector 2, as the KDF calls its new domain in Somalia, which spans the country's Lower Juba and Gedo provinces. The southern axis is one of the more cinematic war zones Africa has to offer at the moment; aside from the airports, it includes an encampment overlooking the ocean and the Kismayo port, which on most days calls to mind a Turner painting, with carved-wood barges tethered two deep to its dock.

Operation Linda Nchi is the first combat deployment ever undertaken by the KDF; until now it has been confined to supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions. The original aim of Linda Nchi, which means "Protect the Nation" in Kiswahili, was to keep the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabab out of Kenya. But the KDF has now been in Somalia for over a year. It has 2,500 troops here and plans to deploy 2,000 more by next year. According to commanders, the new mission is to "mop up" what is left of al-Shabab -- that is, to end the Islamist insurgency for good.

The KDF soldiers have made a convincing show of going to war. At headquarters, at the new airport, they've dug hundreds of bunkers into the red earth and undergrowth and have set up tarp-roofed tents and makeshift showers. Artillery guns and tanks sit among them in a manner that suggests imminent battle; but the troops here haven't seen action in months. Lots of green plastic sandbags are everywhere, as well as trucks and armored personnel carriers with AU, for African Union, printed on their doors. A surveillance drone sits in the hangar.

Nearby is the officers' lounge, a thatched hut outfitted with thermoses of lemon tea and a television with satellite-dish service. In early December, Col. Adan Hassan, commander of the 3rd Battalion, who oversees the airport, greeted me and three other reporters there. A tall, stoop-shouldered man, Hassan wore well-pressed fatigues and wire-rim glasses. By way of introduction, he told us that the area around us was still alive with al-Shabab holdouts. "They usually start firing in the evening. When they fire, don't move; just look there," he said, pointing vaguely toward the desert. He looked at the female reporters. "For the ladies, you can sleep in the armored personnel carriers if you want."

At the far end of the hut a bedsheet was draped on the wall. A projector sat before it. A soldier at a laptop, his helmet strapped on tightly, a semiautomatic rifle leaning against his chair, brought up a PowerPoint presentation. A series of slides outlined the obstacles facing Kenya in Somalia. Hassan read them off. Commenting on a slide titled "Demography," he pointed out that, in Somalia, "Loyalty revolves around clan" and "Clan is unifying and divisive factor." Under "Challenges in Local Areas," he listed "nonexistent government structures" and "vastness of sector."

I asked Hassan how many al-Shabab fighters Kenya had killed or captured on its march to Kismayo. "I don't have the number at my fingertips, but I assure you we degraded them," he said. "When we entered this town, it was deserted. Many people had fled. But now, you wouldn't believe it. They are welcoming us. It's because of the confidence we've given them, the security we've given them."

All the officers in the hut, I noticed, including Hassan, wore new white-and-green AU armbands with gold trim. They were clearly fresh out of the box, meant to emphasize to us that the Kenyan troops are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). I asked Hassan how Kenya's and AMISOM's objectives coincide, or don't. They are one and the same, he assured me. "We're not an occupational force," he said. "If the Somali people are secure, we're secure."

Kenya's particular security interests kept creeping back into his answers, however. When another reporter asked how a spate of recent bombings in Kenya, believed to be al-Shabab-related, influenced the operation, Hassan made clear that "what is happening in Kenya has nothing to do with what we're doing here." But then, he added, "We'll finish them here in Somalia; then we'll look for them in Kenya." Asked about Kismayo, he said it "was not an objective of the KDF. It was an AMISOM objective."

This both is and isn't true. Since AMISOM decided to assemble a multinational force to go after al-Shabab in 2010, taking Kismayo has been viewed as the endgame, at least of the military phase of the mission. The city was al-Shabab's base and the port its economic engine, providing an estimated $35 million to $50 million a year to the group. And as the interests of the United States and European Union, Somalia's largest bilateral and multilateral donors, respectively, have shifted in the last few years from targeting high-value al Qaeda in East Africa figures to degrading al-Shabab and shoring up Somalia, Kismayo began to be viewed as a priority by them too. In the West, the capture of the city is now seen not just as a win against Islamist political extremism, but a symbolic victory in the battle for what may be the world's most dysfunctional country. The United Nations covers AMISOM's budget, and most of that outlay is covered by Europe. Washington has put at least $500 million into AMISOM and the Somali army since 2007. The Pentagon and CIA, which have hugely increased operations in Somalia since the 9/11 attacks, provide intelligence support to AMISOM, along with the British, French, and Israelis. Despite all this help, Kenya's victory in Kismayo was greeted with surprised joy. No one expected the KDF to prevail so quickly.

But it is also the case that Kenya was never interested in pitching into the bloody battle for the capital, Mogadishu, which has killed over 500 AMISOM troops. Kenya has always wanted to get in and out of Somalia as quickly as possible, and it has known all along that taking Kismayo, just 180 miles from the Kenya-Somalia border and the nearest city, with a massive show of force could be the way to do that. Capturing Kismayo was "significant for Kenya because there were serious questions about its willingness to fight," a Western diplomat told me.

More of a mystery is why Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki chose to launch Linda Nchi to begin with. The question is still a matter of gossip among Kenya's political class over a year after the operation began. Theories abound. There are the strange politics of the African Union, which has few of the dictates for cooperation that bind EU countries and at least as much fractiousness. Some think AU members, particularly Ethiopia, browbeat Kibaki into providing troops. Some think he has been watching with growing anxiety the rise of Rwanda and Uganda (the latter has contributed and lost the most troops in Somalia), whose soldiers-turned-presidents have turned their small countries into economic performers and darlings of the West, while the poverty and corruption in Kenya, once East Africa's leader, have worsened. Still others think Kibaki was so humiliated by the election violence that overtook Kenya in 2007 -- official estimates are that 1,400 people were killed -- and by the International Criminal Court indictments that followed, that he jumped at the chance to edit his legacy with a patriotic war against Islamists in the run-up to an election year. (The Kenyan elections have since been postponed to 2013.) Some believe it all. "Kenya's very vulnerable right now," a U.N. employee who works on Somali issues told me. When I asked in what way, this person said, "In every way."

Then there are the usual noises about murky monetary interests. Kenyan businessmen want to wrap up the black market that flows through Kismayo, it is said, or energy companies want Kenya to control disputed coastal waters so they can tap unproven hydrocarbon reserves offshore. One certainty is that Kenya is trying to attract investment to a new port on the island of Lamu; the more trade it can siphon off from Kismayo, the better for Kenya.

But "Protect the Nation" can be taken at face value too. The mess of security and humanitarian problems caused by Somalia has become a national obsession in Kenya. A half-century ago, the tribal domains that span the two countries were ineptly split, resulting in a long-running border dispute. Today, roughly 2.5 million Somalis live in Kenya, many in dire poverty. Half a million of them inhabit camps around the town of Dadaab, just across the border with Somalia, in what may be the world's largest permanent refugee crisis. Since al-Shabab came to power in southern Somalia in 2009, it has taken advantage of a 400-mile-long porous border to sow a campaign of terror in Kenya. According to a report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, al-Shabab recruits disaffected youth from refugee camps and Somali slums in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other cities (along with Muslim and Christian Kenyans) to carry out bombings and shootings in Kenya. Churches, police stations, and city buses have been targeted. The last month has seen a series of grenade attacks in Nairobi's Somali-dominated Eastleigh neighborhood, including one on the night of Dec. 7, at a mosque, that killed five people and maimed a member of parliament.

Kenya had a real and pressing need to pursue al-Shabab, in other words, and particularly to target Kismayo. And walking around the KDF camp at the airport, talking to soldiers, I found they all repeated the same mantra: We're defending our home. Contrary to what Hassan had said, the attacks in Kenya had everything to do with the mission, as they saw it. (The similarities to the arguments one heard in the run-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq -- "we'll fight them there so we don't have to fight them here" -- were striking.)

Personal pride was involved too. I spoke with soldiers who'd been in the KDF for 20 and 30 years. They had watched their army progress from a barely trained, ill-provisioned afterthought to one of the most professional fighting forces on the continent. They wanted the world to know about it. "We're ready to fight a real war now," one longtime enlisted man told me.

Even with that advantage, though, President Kibaki could hardly have arrived at the decision to invade Somalia more awkwardly. Certain members of his government had encouraged him to respond to al-Shabab by annexing part of Somalia's southern borderland, in an effort to create a kind of Kenyan protectorate that would be known as Jubaland. The United States and the European Union, however, discouraged the plan. Still, beginning in 2008, Kenya trained and equipped the Ras Kamboni militia, which is believed to have several hundred men around Kismayo. In a scenario that invited visions of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the KDF drew up plans to assemble an army made up of Ras Kamboni militiamen and (taking a cue from its enemy, apparently) Somalis from refugee camps to launch a proxy war against al-Shabab. Kenya's Western allies refused to sign off on that scheme. "We saw it as very risky and potentially illegal," one Western diplomat told me.

Kenya had good reasons for staying out of Somalia, and one very good reason in particular -- Ethiopia. In 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded, with U.S. military support, after years of cross-border incursions by Somali militias. They fought their way impressively to Mogadishu, where they joined up with Somali national troops in an attempt to pacify the city. It was a disaster. Thousands of civilians were killed; several hundred thousand were displaced. Attacks on Ethiopian troops increased, as did attacks in Ethiopia. Troop morale plummeted, and by 2009, al-Shabab had the Ethiopians on their heels. Somalia was turning into another graveyard for empires, it appeared to Kibaki. If Ethiopia, with its soldiers hardened by years of civil war and with its American helicopters, could find itself in such a quagmire, he worried, what fate awaited Kenya?

Then something unexpected happened: Somalia began to turn around. The populace began turning on al-Shabab. The African Union stood up its army, and slowly but steadily it cleared the Islamists from Mogadishu. The Ethiopians regained their composure and took control in the fractious southwest border region. Thanks to international maritime patrols, piracy off the coast abated. And the United States and European Union poured funds into the effort. For the first time in 20 years, people started talking about Somalia showing promise. After decades of default cynicism toward Somalia, "There's now a fresh look being taken," the U.S. special representative for Somalia, James Swan, told me.

By the fall of 2011, the African Union had 12,000 troops in Somalia, most in Mogadishu, and Kibaki faced a choice: Either he could play it safe and disappoint his regional partners and the growing chorus of Kenyans calling for a war with al-Shabab, or he could get involved and risk a campaign of reactionary attacks in Kenya, along with television news scenes of Kenyan soldiers dying in the Somali desert -- all of it in the run-up to an election. After a spate of al-Shabab-sponsored kidnappings of European tourists and aid workers in Kenya, the choice was all but made for him.

Kibaki announced the invasion in October 2011 -- two days after it had started. Kenya's neighbors were taken aback; few of them had been consulted, it seems. No one was as surprised as the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, which publicly questioned Linda Nchi. Only after a round of frenzied post-facto shuttle diplomacy with Nairobi did it voice approval. Even the African Union had its doubts. The KDF force wasn't formally admitted to AMISOM until four months later, in February of this year.

Linda Nchi's opening went as badly as its planning. For reasons that escape comprehension, the KDF moved in as the fall rainy season began. Vehicles got bogged down in rain and mud. When Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga traveled to Israel to ask for help, al-Shabab had a public relations field day. Not only was Kenya a stooge of the West; it was now engaged in a war against Islam. Before a shot had been fired, the Somali populace was turning on Kenya.

But, after a series of false starts, the Kenyan forces found their rhythm. Thanks to a special agreement with AMISOM, they were allowed to bring in bombers and warships. They pounded al-Shabab positions across Lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Gedo, and then moved north, taking town after town. After a stiff 10-day fight at the village of Miido, the KDF turned east and raced for the coast. In the early-morning hours of Sept. 28, special-operations forces units landed on the beach and parachuted into the interior. They were followed later that day by two mechanized columns, including Ras Kamboni and the Somali National Army, which converged on Kismayo from the west and south, while an amphibious detachment landed on the beach. They quickly overtook a contingent of al-Shabab fighters holed up in caves in a lime quarry on Kismayo's northern outskirts

The assault on the city was well choreographed -- and, as it turned out, overkill. A field commander told me, "The opposition was not what we expected." When I asked why that was, a faint smile overtook his lips, and he said, "Maybe they knew they were up against a better force." The truth, however, is more complicated. Al-Shabab had no intention of defending Kismayo.

* * *

Mogadishu is famous for its destroyed infrastructure. By contrast, Kismayo, home to about 180,000 people, is striking for its lack of infrastructure. Locals will tell you this is because Kismayo, a medieval fishing settlement that evolved into a spur of the Swahili-coast livestock trade during the colonial era, has changed hands so often. In the 1890s, the sultan of Muscat ceded Kismayo to Britain, which in turn gave it to Italy. After Somalia won its independence in 1960, Kismayo's business elite turned its port into a regional trade hub, but when the civil war began in 1991, the city was flung between warlords. U.S. Marines occupied it, with little effect. It was fought over for more than a decade by local militias, the Transitional Federal Government, the Ethiopians, Ras Kamboni, and al-Shabab's predecessor, the Islamic Courts Union, which shifted its base from Mogadishu to Kismayo in 2006. Al-Shabab, the extremist wing of the Islamic Courts Union, took full control of the city in late 2009.

The day after arriving at the airport camp, we piled into an armored personnel carrier in a military convoy. At the front of the line of vehicles was a SUV containing a machine that jams radio frequencies used to detonate improvised explosive devices. The KDF soldiers wore body armor and helmets. Riding heedlessly alongside us in a "technical" -- the battlewagon of choice in Somalia, a stripped-down pickup truck mounted with a Russian-made DShK anti-aircraft gun -- was their Ras Kamboni escort. The only thing the gunner had on for protection was a pair of earphones.

We passed by an open-air dump where garbage smoldered, by encampments of domed huts made from tree branches and cloth, and then into Kismayo's dirt streets, which are lined with one-story stucco buildings. Al-Shabab insignias were still prominent on walls, a reminder of the suffering inflicted. When al-Shabab came into southern Somalia, it helped decimate what had been the country's breadbasket by taxing and harassing farmers and pastoralists, and it then forced out aid agencies that were trying to feed the population. Kismayo's nameless main road, the only paved one, runs through Liberty Square, where a toppled monumental column erected after independence now lies on the ground in blocks. Under al-Shabab, Liberty Square became a stage for public floggings, dismemberments, and executions. When its police wanted to bury people up to their necks and then stone them to death, as they did to a young woman accused of adultery in 2008, they used the softer ground of the nearby soccer stadium.

At the Kismayo port, freighters from India, Pakistan, and Syria were docked, unloading shipments of fruit juice, chewing gum, milk, and sugar. Al-Shabab derived most of its revenue from taxing the goods that went in and out of it. No great fans of al-Shabab, the merchants nonetheless allowed it to rule Kismayo because it was good for business -- al-Shabab simplified the bribery system and did away with competing militia roadblocks set up to extort trade. Now the KDF occupies the port's warehouses and inspects every ship.

A delegation of merchants and community leaders met us in one of the warehouses. One by one, they came before us to list their grievances. "We ask for things from the central government, but they don't give us anything," one man complained. "The world is doing nothing for us."

A port administrator I met, Abduli, said that though al-Shabab was good for business in certain ways, it wasn't worth the toll the group exacted on Kismayo. "In the port, in the market, Shabab always, 'Give money, give money, give money.' Shabab tax hundred dollars per shipment!" he said. "Shabab kill everyone. Kill mothers, kill babies, kill everything." When I asked whether he was affiliated with a particular militia or other group, Abduli admitted he was a member of Ras Kamboni. But, he said, "Now clan is over. Tribe, over."

"What comes next?" I asked.

"Is come tourism!" he said. "Is come tourism to Kismayo. Kismayo beautiful. Every culture, black and white, come. I want life, you know? I want the government. I want the administration. Shabab attacking is problem only."

Al-Shabab is still attacking. The week before we arrived, gunmen shot up the home of a local security official. Three days later, grenades were thrown into a crowd. The victims were brought to Kismayo General Hospital. They lay in beds in the hospital's courtyard, under a tree, surrounded by refuse. I spoke with a woman whose head and leg were bandaged. A grenade hit her near the temple, she told me, and then landed in the lap of a man sitting near her. It killed him, but she somehow survived. "I was very lucky," she said. An even worse wound was caused by a bullet to her leg, which didn't come from the attackers. After the grenades were thrown, Ras Kamboni troops present at the scene shot indiscriminately into the crowd and the air. Two other casualties I met at the hospital were uninjured by the explosions but were shot afterward by the militiamen.

After returning from the hospital, I walked out to the wire at the new airport camp. A line of small bunkers with machine gun nests faced an expanse of sand and shrubs. I spoke to a pair of Kenyan soldiers who were playing checkers with soda bottle caps. I asked what they thought of their counterparts in Ras Kamboni and the Somali National Army. Their feelings were mixed, they said. All the Somalis were ill-equipped, badly trained, and badly paid (if paid at all), but some were more disciplined than others and some knew how to fight al-Shabab.

"In guerrilla warfare you don't need training," one of the soldiers told me. "You just need to know how to shoot and duck."

I asked whether he trusted the Somalis. "We have no choice," he said. It's well-known to the troops here that Ras Kamboni's leader, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, was a high-ranking administrator in al-Shabab before turning against them. Indeed, Ras Kamboni was an Islamist insurgency before al-Shabab was even created. Many families in the area have members in al-Shabab and others in Ras Kamboni or the Somali army. The Kenyans suspect they tip one another off about operations. But there's little he can do about it, the Kenyan soldier said. "Now we are brothers."

Some Ras Kamboni fighters have been tasked with guarding the villages around Kismayo, where they live among the population. Others man the airport terminal. They stand out starkly from the KDF troops. They wear tattered solid-green fatigues and have no body armor, helmets, or, often, boots -- they've grown used to facing al-Shabab head-on in sandals, with old single-shot rifles. In the terminal, whose halls smell of urine and excrement, they sleep on blankets on the floor beside walls decorated with graffiti left by al-Shabab. One picture shows an al-Shabab technical shooting at a helicopter. It looks like a child's rendering of a scene from Black Hawk Down, and indeed it may be. Al-Shabab reportedly recruited children from Kismayo to put on the front line. (And the 1993 episode has become part of the national mythos.)

Ras Kamboni and the Somali national troops have been accused of mistreating Somalis. So has the KDF. So far, Kenya has refused to allow human rights investigators into the places under its control; nonetheless, Human Rights Watch has advised Somali refugees in Kenya who fled the fighting to not return yet, because they may face abuse by the KDF.

This is precisely what President Kibaki wanted to avoid. Perhaps for that reason, after taking Kismayo, Kenya has cooled its heels. Hassan spends most of his time these days sitting in a hut near his tent sipping tea and speaking on a cell phone. The KDF soldiers appear to be mostly concerned with keeping a neat camp. One day, I watched a group of them sweep a runway -- for two hours. I asked how they liked life during wartime. "I've been here for six months," one soldier said. "Can you find me an American wife?"

It's generally assumed that success in Somalia, particularly in the south, depends on the ability of the African Union and the new Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to help the country's desperate population as quickly as possible. They're already behind. Despite a budget that will approach $800 million this year, AMISOM has only just begun to think about planning for the peace -- in part because it thought the fighting would drag on much longer. "They never expected to win this fast. They thought they'd have time to figure out the civilian component," says Alex Rondos, the EU special representative to the Horn of Africa. "They're victims of their own success."

When Linda Nchi began last year, an editorial in the Daily Nation, Kenya's leading newspaper, pointed out that after troops captured territory, "Kenya's biggest challenge is to prosecute an effective counter-insurgency campaign to degrade Al-Shabaab." Everyone I spoke with, from AMISOM officials to diplomats, agreed with that analysis. They also agreed that al-Shabab is probably not in retreat from southern Somalia so much as it's in retrenchment. With contributions from the Somali diaspora drying up thanks to its growing unpopularity, al-Shabab knew, long before the KDF reached Kismayo, that it didn't have the manpower or money to face a conventional army. So its fighters have blended into the population, where they are recruiting young freelance assassins and waiting to see what AMISOM does next. Al-Shabab fighters have studied the Taliban and Iraqi insurgencies, and in some cases contributed to them. "Shabab has been preparing for this onslaught for a long time. They've been preparing to sink in, to make the leadership mobile," an intelligence analyst involved in operations against al-Shabab told me. "Time is not on our side."

Yet neither AMISOM nor the KDF appears to have a long-term counterinsurgency strategy. One possible reason for this is that senior officials in the new Somali administration and AMISOM are involved in negotiations with al-Shabab to disarm. Another, more obvious, reason is that Kenya has no experience in counterinsurgency (its Anti-Terrorism Police Unit investigates al-Shabab affiliates in Kenya). But probably the most important reason is that Kenya doesn't want to get embroiled in a guerrilla war like the one in Mogadishu. "We're seeing a caution about going beyond areas they can control," one diplomat said.

At the same time, Kenya is attempting to demonstrate, with a pitiable lack of subtlety, its allegiance to Ras Kamboni and other powerful elements in the south that are suspicious of Mogadishu and President Mohamud's centralizing tendencies. Last week, Mohamud and a Somali delegation were supposed to have met with Kenyan officials in Nairobi. The day of their flight, Kenya informed them they'd be denied entrance.

At the airport camp, Hassan said that his mission now is to "mop up" al-Shabab holdouts. But when I asked whether he had men collecting intelligence among the population, he said that was being left to Ras Kamboni. I asked on two occasions whether he was conducting regular patrols. The first time he said no. The second time he said yes, but admitted that they were mostly meant to secure the airport. Asked whether he was conducting systematic house raids or attempting any other standard counterinsurgency measures, Hassan offered: "We've cordoned villages." I asked how many. "Two," he said.

When I asked why, in the two months since the KDF took Kismayo, no local al-Shabab higher-ups had been captured, even though they are all personally known to Sheikh Madobe and others in the area, he said, "I don't know. That's a question for the international community." He added, "I'm only doing what I've been told to do." ..via  FOREIGN POLICY

Ex-Somali Police Commissioner General Mohamed Abshir

Ex-Somali Police Commissioner  General Mohamed Abshir

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre with general Mohamad Ali samater

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre with general Mohamad Ali samater
Somalia army parade 1979

Sultan Kenadid

Sultan Kenadid
Sultanate of Obbia

President of the United Meeting with Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the Somali Republic,

Seyyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan

Seyyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan

Sultan Mohamud Ali Shire

Sultan Mohamud Ali Shire
Sultanate of Warsengeli

Commemorating the 40th anniversary of Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre

Commemorating the 40th anniversary of Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre
Siad Barre ( A somali Hero )

MoS Moments of Silence

MoS Moments of Silence
honor the fallen

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre and His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre  and His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie
Beautiful handshake

May Allah bless him and give Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre..and The Honourable Ronald Reagan

May Allah bless him and give  Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre..and The Honourable Ronald Reagan
Honorable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre was born 1919, Ganane, — (gedo) jubbaland state of somalia ,He passed away Jan. 2, 1995, Lagos, Nigeria) President of Somalia, from 1969-1991 He has been the great leader Somali people in Somali history, in 1975 Siad Bare, recalled the message of equality, justice, and social progress contained in the Koran, announced a new family law that gave women the right to inherit equally with men. The occasion was the twenty –seventh anniversary of the death of a national heroine, Hawa Othman Tako, who had been killed in 1948 during politbeginning in 1979 with a group of Terrorist fied army officers known as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).Mr Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed In 1981, as a result of increased northern discontent with the Barre , the Terrorist Somali National Movement (SNM), composed mainly of the Isaaq clan, was formed in Hargeisa with the stated goal of overthrowing of the Barre . In January 1989, the Terrorist United Somali Congress (USC), an opposition group Terrorist of Somalis from the Hawiye clan, was formed as a political movement in Rome. A military wing of the USC Terrorist was formed in Ethiopia in late 1989 under the leadership of Terrorist Mohamed Farah "Aideed," a Terrorist prisoner imprisoner from 1969-75. Aideed also formed alliances with other Terrorist groups, including the SNM (ONLF) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Terrorist Ogadeen sub-clan force under Terrorist Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in the Bakool and Bay regions of Southern Somalia. , 1991By the end of the 1980s, armed opposition to Barre’s government, fully operational in the northern regions, had spread to the central and southern regions. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes, claiming refugee status in neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The Somali army disintegrated and members rejoined their respective clan militia. Barre’s effective territorial control was reduced to the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu, resulting in the withdrawal of external assistance and support, including from the United States. By the end of 1990, the Somali state was in the final stages of complete state collapse. In the first week of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as USC and SNM Terrorist advanced toward Mogadishu. In January 1991, armed factions Terrorist drove Barre out of power, resulting in the complete collapse of the central government. Barre later died in exile in Nigeria. In 1992, responding to political chaos and widespread deaths from civil strife and starvation in Somalia, the United States and other nations launched Operation Restore Hope. Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the operation was designed to create an environment in which assistance could be delivered to Somalis suffering from the effects of dual catastrophes—one manmade and one natural. UNITAF was followed by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The United States played a major role in both operations until 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew. Warlordism, terrorism. PIRATES ,(TRIBILISM) Replaces the Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre administration .While the terrorist threat in Somalia is real, Somalia’s rich history and cultural traditions have helped to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. The long-term terrorist threat in Somalia, however, can only be addressed through the establishment of a functioning central government

The Honourable Ronald Reagan,

When our world changed forever

His Excellency ambassador Dr. Maxamed Saciid Samatar (Gacaliye)

His Excellency ambassador Dr. Maxamed Saciid Samatar (Gacaliye)
Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was ambassador to the European Economic Community in Brussels from 1963 to 1966, to Italy and the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] in Rome from 1969 to 1973, and to the French Govern­ment in Paris from 1974 to 1979.

Dr. Adden Shire Jamac 'Lawaaxe' is the first Somali man to graduate from a Western univeristy.

Dr. Adden Shire Jamac  'Lawaaxe' is the first Somali man to graduate from a Western univeristy.
Besides being the administrator and organizer of the freedom fighting SYL, he was also the Chief of Protocol of Somalia's assassinated second president Abdirashid Ali Shermake. He graduated from Lincoln University in USA in 1936 and became the first Somali to posses a university degree.

Soomaaliya الصومال‎ Somali Republic

Soomaaliya الصومال‎ Somali Republic

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The Foundation is dedicated to networking like-minded Somalis opposed to the terrorist insurgency that is plaguing our beloved homeland and informing the international public at large about what is really happening throughout the Horn of Africa region.

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We Are Winning the War on Terrorism in Horn of Africa

The threat is from violent extremists who are a small minority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims, the threat is real. They distort Islam. They kill man, woman and child; Christian and Hindu, Jew and Muslim. They seek to create a repressive caliphate. To defeat this enemy, we must understand who we are fighting against, and what we are fighting for.

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